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Abstract 
 
Competition authorities carry out investigations and impose legal penalties on firms 
which are caught infringing the competition law. The rationale of this policy is to 
prevent firms from distorting free competition in a way that is detrimental to 
economic efficiency and at the same time to deter them from engaging in cartels and 
other anti-competitive behaviour. In this paper I try to evaluate the impact of major 
antitrust & abuse of dominant position investigations on firm’s financial value. For 
this purpose I divide the period of each investigation into two sub periods: the 
‘Investigation period”, which begins from the outset of the anticompetitive case and 
ends when the competition authority issues the statement of objections to the 
infringed firms and the ‘Deterrence period’, which follows the ‘Investigation period’ 
and ends with the final judgment of the court. I use aggregate regression based 
approach to estimate the Average & Cumulative Average Residuals of the firms 
which infringe articles 1 & 2 of Greek Competition Law. The empirical results imply 
that the release of the final decisions of the Hellenic Competition Commission and the 
Court of Appeal negatively affect the share price of the infringed firms.  
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 1 Introduction 
 
Antitrust policy aims at preventing companies from abusing market power, restraining 
free trade, and/or forming anticompetitive agreements. Its objective is to foster 
competition in the interest of consumer welfare. Therefore, effective antitrust laws 
imposed by competition authorities are fundamental in competition policy as they 
prevent firms from distorting effective competition.  
Regulator can impose legal and regulatory penalties on firms which are caught 
infringing the competition law so as to dishearten them from engaging in cartels and 
other anti-competitive behaviour. Optimal antitrust policy demands that the costs that 
firms incur when found guilty of antitrust infringement are high enough to make the 
infringement unprofitable. The financial sanction should exceed the expected profits 
from the anticompetitive activity in order to compensate for ineffective detection. 
Sanctions also may offer an incentive to cartel participants to deviate from the cartel 
and provide critical information to competition authorities to benefit from leniency. 
In this paper, I carry out an econometric analysis to explore the effect of antitrust & 
abuse of dominant position investigations on the share prices of firms which have 
infringed Greek competition law. Especially, I analyse a sample of major Greek 
antitrust & abuse of dominant position cases during the period from 2000 to 2010 and 
I try to evaluate the private damages imposed to the infringed firms. For this purpose I 
define the ‘Investigation period”, which begins from the outset of the investigation 
and ends when the competition authority issues the statement of objections to the 
infringed firms and the ‘Deterrence period’, which follows the ‘Investigation period’ 
and ends with the final judgment of the court.   
I use aggregated data analysis (regression based approach) so as to explore the 
average effect of antitrust & abuse of dominant position cases on the stock prices of 
involved firms. The econometric results imply that during the ‘Investigation Period’ 
and the ‘Deterrence Period’, the cumulative average residuals of the infringed firms 
drop by -2,85% and -2,78% respectively. That is, the release of the final decision of 
the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) and the final decision of the Court of 
Appeal negatively affect the share price of the infringed firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the major steps 
of an antitrust & abuse of dominant position case during the Investigation Period and 
the Deterrence Period. Section 3 reviews the literature & section 4 presents the 
sample and the econometric models which I use in the remainder of the paper. Section 
5 introduces the empirical results and section 6 concludes. 
2 The Institutional Framework 
2.1 The Greek Competition Law 
 
The HCC is the only competition authority for the enforcement of Greek Competition 
Law, whose main provision against antitrust and abuse of dominant position 
infringements are articles 1 and 2 of Law No. 3959/20111 (Greek Competition Law).  
Fines may be imposed to firms which have infringed the abovementioned article 
according to the guidelines for setting fines imposed under Article 9 of Greek 
Competition Law and the determination of the range of annual sales from products or 
services that defines the basic amount of fines for infringements of articles 1, 2 of the 
                                                 
1
 Article 1 of Greek Competition Law deals with Cartels, whereas article 2 of the same Law deals with 
the Abuse of Dominance position.  
same Law and articles 81 & 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community2. 
Especially, article 8 of the May 2006 guidelines states that the base fines may be up to 
30% of the company’s annual sales in the market to which the antitrust & abuse of 
dominant position infringement relates. The percentage is cumulatively calculated on 
the annual sales for each year of the offense.  
During the period from 2000 to 2009 the HCC has imposed a total amount of 
290.500.000 euros of fines with respect to articles 1, 2 and 25(2)3 of Greek 
Competition Law (Table 1). The year 2007 the HCC imposed the highest amount of 
fines during the period under consideration (almost 105 million Euros).  
Table 1: Total amount of fines for infringements of articles 1,2 & 25+ of Greek 
Competition Law from 2000 to 2009 ((in thousands euro) 
 Years 
  2000 2001  2002 2003  2004  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Amount of 
Fine per year   4,402  -  3,311  1,129  0,629 19,172 0,015 103,560 55,489 102,790 
Total amount 
of Fines 290,500 
Source: http://www.epant.gr/img/x2/categories/ctg324_1_1275909535.pdf (in Greek) 
+See footnote 3. 
 
2.2 Major steps of an investigation by GDC of HCC 
 
The General Directorate of Competition (GDC) of HCC starts its investigation either 
at its own initiative (a publication in the media, a “non paper”, an unofficial 
                                                 
2
 Articles 101 & 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See also the 
official website of HCC and especially http://www.epant.gr/img/x2/categories/ctg253_3_1193315361-
.pdf and http://www.epant.gr/img/x2/categories/ctg299_3_1247826428.pdf  respectively (in Greek).  
3
 Article 25(2) of the previous Greek Competition Law No. 703/77 (see also article 38(3) of Greek 
Competition Law, as applicable), stated that  
«ιn case of refusal, recalcitrance or delay in providing the requested  
preceding paragraph of information or inaccurate information or incomplete, subject to in Article 29 
of this Act criminal proceedings the Competition Commission: a) where the undertakings or 
associations, managers and employees, as well as private individuals or private entities, imposes a fine 
of fifteen thousand (15,000) million to more than 1% of turnover as calculated in accordance with 
Article 4f in each of them for any offense, b) where public officials or employees of public entities law 
referred to officially initiate disciplinary proceedings for the above violations constitute a disciplinary 
offense.». 
complaint, e.t.c.) or on the basis of an official complaint4 by a third party. Generally 
speaking, there is no a public announcement for the outset of an official investigation. 
 An antitrust and abuse of dominant position investigation contains two crucial sub-
periods: the ‘Investigation period’, which begins from the outset of the investigation 
and ends when the competition authority issues its final decision to the infringed firms 
and the ‘Deterrence period’, which follows immediately after the ‘Investigation 
period’ and ends with the final judgment of the court. 
The crucial steps of procedure during the ‘Investigation period’ are the down raids, 
the Statement of Objections and the final Decision of HCC. If the GDC has suspicious 
that there has been an infringement which violates article 1 (and sometimes article 2) 
of Greek Competition Law, it may carry out a surprise inspection at the premise(s) of 
the firm(s) under investigation so as to gather critical documentary evidences for the 
infringement. 
After a period of Investigation the GDC may issue the Statement of Objections (SoO) 
and send it to the firms under investigation. At the same date it publishes a press 
release with the main points of the statement of objections, subject to the final 
decision of HCC.  
Following the period of the trial procedure, which may last from 1 to 3 months and 
the submission of statements in terms of involved firms, the HCC issues its Decision, 
which may or may not accept the Statement of Objections by the GDC. At the date of 
the final decision the HCC publishes a press release with the main points of its 
Decision. 
                                                 
4
 See article 36 of Greek Competition Law.  
The ‘Deterrence period’5 begins immediately after the issue of the final decision of 
the HCC. Firms which have been fined can appeal to the courts (Court of Appeal 
(CA) and Supreme Court6. Court’s judgements may annul, reduce, uphold or even 
increase7 the fine as well as annul or uphold the overall Decision. 
In this paper I assume the following public information which may affect the share 
price of the infringed firms: a) the down raids, b) the issue of the Statement of 
Objection, c) the final Decision of the HCC and the Court Decisions. The first three 
constitute the ‘Investigation period’, whereas the last two constitute the ‘Deterrence 
period’ (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Nonoverlapping steps of an antitrust & abuse of dominant position 
case 
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Each major step of both periods includes a date of release of the public information. I 
denote that as 0=τ . In Figure 1 there are five specific dates which correspond to the 
                                                 
5
 I call the ‘Deterrence period’ since after the issuing of the final decision the imposed penalties may 
dishearten firms from engaging in cartels and other anti-competitive behaviour.  
6
 In this paper I investigate only the effect of CA’s judgments on infringed stock return.  
7
 To the best of my knowledge, Court’s judgments have never increase fine imposed by the HCC.   
    Investigation Period         Deterrence Period 
five major steps of case ( 1τ = down raids, 2τ = Statement of Objections, 3τ = Final 
Decision of HCC, 4τ = Pre-final Court of Appeal Decision
8
, 5τ = Final Court of 
Appeal Decision). Around s'τ there are nt ....1= days which may be affected from 
the release of the public information. I symbolize the beginning of such a period as 
0t and its end as 1t . Prior to 0t there are 1−n days which are not affected from the 
abovementioned release. Let’s denote *ot  the beginning of the unaffected period and 
10 −t  its end. The whole period under investigation ( )*,TT  includes five sets of 
nt ....1= days and five sets of  1−n  days which correspond to different periods of 
time (nonoverlapping steps of an antitrust & abuse of dominant position case). 
Also, each step of a case includes nonoverlapping stock returns of infringed firms.   
3 Review of the Literature 
 
Studies which attempt to measure the effect of an anticompetitive action on involved 
firm’s stock price are, inter alia, those of Bosch and Eckard (1991), Detre et al., 
(2005)9, Langus & Motta (2009) and Guenster & Van Dijk (2010). All of those studies 
follow disaggregate regression event approach so as to evaluate the impact of the 
antitrust actions on the cumulative residual of the infringed firms10.  
Bosch and Eckard (1991) analyze a sample of 127 firms involved in 57 US federal 
price fixing infringements from 1962 to 1980 and find a statistically significant -
                                                 
8
 The Court of Appeal temporarily recalls the final decision of the HCC until the issuing of its final 
decision. 
9
 There are also several US studies which investigate various aspects of antitrust policy. See, inter alia, 
Burns (1977), Garbade et al. (1982), Gilligan (1986), Bizjak and Coles (1995), Bittlingmayer and 
Hazlett (2000) & De Vany and McMillan (2004). Garbade et al. (1982) investigate 34 companies that 
infringed the Sherman and Clayton Acts from 1934 to 1974, Gilligan (1986) analyse 43 firms 
convicted for resale price maintenance from 1962 to 1985, Bizjak and Coles (1995) evaluate 481 
antitrust cases in the US in the period 1973-1983, Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000) analyse the US 
federal antitrust action against Microsoft in the 1990s and De Vany and McMillan (2004) report the 
effect of infringed actions by vertically integrated movie studios during the period 1939-1949. 
10
 See, inter alia, Fotis et al. (2011) for a study which attempts to measure the competitive effects of 
mergers. 
1.08% drop of cumulative residual across the infringed firms around the release of the 
public information. They point out that the critical part of the estimated residual is 
expected loss of conspiracy-generated profits, rather than reputation damage. They point 
out that price fixing infringement is a profitable deal since its profits exceed expected 
fines, implying that the deterrence effect of antitrust enforcement actions is small. 
Detre et al., (2005) examine 24 US price – fixing cases involving 31 firms from 1981 
to 2001 and find a 3,41% drop of stock return around the release of the public 
information. The authors do not further evaluate possible causes of the negative effect 
of public information on firm’s financial value. 
Langus & Motta (2009) examine the stock market reaction of 88 firms to 55 European 
Commission Decisions from 1969 to 2005. They find a statistically residual of -2% 
around the 1τ and -3% around the 3τ . They suggest that the negative impact of 
‘Investigation Period’ on infringed firm’s share value results predominantly from lost 
monopoly profits. 
Guenster & Van Dijk (2010) analyse the stock market response to antitrust 
investigation announcements, infringement decisions and appeals. The sample of 
involved firms includes 253 firms involved in 118 European antitrust cases over the 
period 1974-2004. They found significantly negative stock price responses of almost -
5% around the dawn raid and 2% around the final decision, and a significantly 
positive response of up to 4% around a successful appeal, which correspond to a total 
market value loss of €24 billion around the surprise inspection and the final decision. 
This paper differs from the abovementioned articles in the following: firstly, I 
estimate aggregate regression based approach with which I present the average & 
cumulative average effect of the release of public information on infringed firm’s 
stock price, secondly, I evaluate a sample of antitrust & abuse of dominant position 
cases from the HCC during the period from 2000 to 2010 and thirdly, I use adjusted 
trade to trade stock returns so as to get serially independent residuals.  
4 Empirical Methodology and Sample Selection 
4.1 Sample Selection 
 
The sample includes 10 completed cases of articles 1 & 2 of Greek Competition Law 
during the period 2000 – 2010 and 5 cases which are still under investigation. I define 
a completed case when the Court of Appeal has issued a decision. I also include a 
case under investigation only in the ‘Investigation Period’. 
Especially, the sample of completed cases includes 3 and 7 cases of article 2 and 1 of 
Law No. 3959/2011 respectively, while the sample of uncompleted cases includes 5 
cases of article 1 of the same Law. In the former sample, the Court of Appeal has 
reduced the fine. The reduction ranges from 19% to 80% of the total amount of 
imposed fine by the final decision of HCC. In one case the Court of Appeal annul the 
HCC’s final decision11. For each case I explicitly determine five s'τ  (see Figure 1) 
and the period around the release of public information from 0t  to 1t . The latter 
includes 5 trading days prior and after of eachτ . I also define the unaffected period 
*
ot - 10 −t from the release of the public information, which includes 300 trading days 
prior to 0t .  
 
                                                 
11
 Due to data limitations I haven’t included 5 cases in the sample of ‘Deterrence Period’.  
4.2 Empirical methodology 
4.2.1 The Calculation of Stock returns 
 
Daily continuously compound stock return for firm j is calculated as follows: 
( ) ( )1,,, lnln −−= tjtjtj PPR    (1) 
Following Maynes & Ramsey (1993), Bartholdy et al. (2007) and Fotis & Polemis (2010a), I 
incorporate the infrequent trading phenomenon which appears when some stocks do not trade 
daily in the stock exchange. In such a case, the estimated variance and co-variance of the 
stock performance will positively correlate with their trade frequency.  
Especially, I use adjusted trade to trade return with the time interval of non trading dates. That 
is, assuming stationarity one day return generating process, the multiperiod return for firm 
j ending on date t  is12 








=
−−
+−
t
t
ntjtjtj
ntjtjtj
t
PPP
PPP
R
..........,2,1,
1.........,1,,
ˆ
.....
ˆˆ
ˆ
.......
ˆ
ln    (2) 
where tn  is the length of the interval of non trading dates
13
 ending at date t  and utjP −,ˆ is the 
unobserved stock price of firm j for date ut − ( 1.......1 −= tnu ). Therefore, the trade to 
trade return is the sum of tn  unobserved one day returns. By dividing (2) with tn  I derive the 
adjusted trade to trade return, which adjusts the variability in the interval length. Following 
equation (1) the adjusted trade to trade return is as follows: 
( ) ( )
t
utjtj
tj
n
PP
R −
−
= ,,
,
lnln
   (3) 
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 See also equation (3) in Mayens & Ramsey (1993). 
13
 The period of trading dates between the trade at period t and the previously successful traded date. 
The trade to trade approach «uses all available information about total stock and 
market returns over time and no bias is introduced by attempting to estimate 
unobserved daily stock returns as occurs with the lumped or uniform techniques. 
However, since trade to trade returns ignore information about daily market returns 
over non-trading periods, it is not clear that it is theoretically superior to the lumped 
method». 
In the literature14 they have been proposed alternative methodologies so as to deal 
with the infrequent trading phenomenon. The most frequently used method is the 
lumped returns method which calculates daily returns from the stock price series and 
produces zero returns for non trading days & «relatively large positive or negative 
returns on days when the stock trades». This method underestimates the variance of 
returns and therefore biases the t-statistics used to test abnormal performance. 
The simple returns method15 calculates daily returns only for days for which stock 
prices are available. The daily abnormal return is obtained by subtracting the market 
return on these days. This method produces unbiased estimates of abnormal returns on 
the days calculated, but gives no information of returns on days with no trade. It may 
produce inconclusive outcomes regarding the event study if the number of days of no 
trade is quite long.  
The uniform returns method calculates the daily returns between trading days and 
allocates the average daily return to each day for which trade does not occur. 
Therefore, the same stock return is allocated for all of the non trading days.  This 
method performs about the same as lumped returns method.  
                                                 
14
 See Bartholdy et al. (2007), p. 5-6 and Maynes & Ramsey (1993), p. 147-149.  
15
 See Fotis & Polemis (2010a), p. 5,9. 
However, even when returns are calculated on a trade to trade basis, there is a 
possibility that a high prevalence of zero returns may occur. Those zero returns are 
likely to lead to positive serial correlation in the return series. In that case, the trade to 
trade approach will only reduce, but not eliminate, the bias on findings towards the 
rejection of serial independence. In this paper the percentage of zero returns is low 
(<10% of the total number of observations).  
4.2.2 The Estimated model 
 
I estimate the average effect of five releases of public information ( 1τ = down raids, 
2τ = Statement of Objections, 3τ = Final Decision of HCC, 4τ = Pre-final Court of 
Appeal Decision, 5τ = Final Court of Appeal Decision) on infringed firm’s financial 
value. For this scope, I elaborate the following econometric model for eachτ 16 
∑ = ++∆++=
1
0
)(
,
,,
t
t t
mj pARRaR
τ ττ
ττ εγβ    (4) 
where
k
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R i jj ∑ ==
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τ
τ
1 ,
, , κ.......1=j , the sj'∗κ  trade to trade stock returns of 
infringed firms at 5...1=τ , 
κ
κ
τ
τ
∑ == 1 ,, i mm
R
R , the average return of market index of 
each j in the τ , s'∆  are dummy variables assuming value 1 on date 10 .....tt=τ and 
zero on 1−n dates prior to 0t  and )( pAR  is the autoregressive component of order 
p .  
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 Except from 4τ which I use OLS. See Table A2-2 in Appendix 2. 
I estimate equation (4) for each τ  over the combined period ( )*,TT . Each dummy 
variable coefficient corresponds to the average effect (residual) of τ on infringed 
firm’s stock value.  
Equation (4) uses average stock returns of infringed firms of the specificτ . Despite 
the fact that the averaging is not over the same time points (i.e. different infringed 
firms from different antitrust & abuse of dominant position cases), the regression 
works quite well since the values of βα &  in equation (4) are the same as the 
estimated values of equation (4) under the assumption of equally weighted portofolios 
(i.e. different infringed firms from the same antitrust & abuse of dominant position 
case)17. The null hypothesis of estimated model (4) is 
0':
,0 =sH γτ    (5) 
I use Ljung-Box Q-statistics so as to evaluate the null hypothesis that there is no 
autocorrelation in the residuals up to order p . In case of serially correlated residuals I 
estimate an AR(p) model. If the autoregressive model does not ameliorate the 
volatility in residuals I estimate a GARCH(1,1) model, which it has been found to 
capture adequately the stock return volatility clustering18. That is, a GARCH(1,1) 
model can be written as follows: 
2
1
2
1
2
−− ++= ttt βσαεωσ    (6) 
                                                 
17
 The underlying assumption behind that is that the s'β estimates of each firm are not related to 
specific date return. So, following Pynnönen (2005), ‘the covariation between them can be assumed to 
be approximately zero’. 
18
 Since the period around the release of public information from 0t  to 1t does not include several days, 
it is feasible equation (6) to capture different volatility levels for different 10 ' tstt ≤≤ without 
requiring large number o observations. 
where 2tσ is the one-period ahead forecast variance based on past information 
(conditional variance), ε  are the residuals from equation (4), ω the constant term of 
equation (6), 2 1−tε  the ARCH – term and 2 1−tσ  the GARCH - term.  
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A1-1 in Appendix 1 reports normality tests of average stock returns of infringed 
firms (the dependent variable of estimated equations) and market index (the, inter 
alia,  independent variable of estimated equations). It is evident from the p-values of 
all tests that the normality assumption of stock returns cannot be rejected even at 
a=0,10 level of significance (except from market index return in 2τ  were the p-value 
of Jarque-Bera test is 0,06). 
Tables A1-2 & A1-3 summarizes descriptive statistics of stock returns of infringed 
firms in both 0t - 1t  and  
*
ot  - 10 −t  periods. From both Tables we see that the mean of 
the average returns is higher in 0t - 1t  period than in 
*
ot  - 10 −t , but the difference is 
not statistically significant in terms of p-values of Table A1-3. The same picture holds 
for the estimated Standard Deviation of the average returns of involved firms. The 
difference in almost all cases ranges from 5% to 20% (except from average returns 
in 4τ ). However, the specified difference is not statistically significant in 4 out of 5 
s'τ  indicating that the stock returns of infringed firms in 2τ may exhibit volatility 
effect due to the release of public information at dateτ 19. 
                                                 
19
 I use GARCH(1,1) to estimate the effect of the release of public information at 2τ . See Table A2-2 
in Appendix 2. 
Table A2-1 in Appendix 2 reports normality tests of residuals of estimated equations. 
It is evident from the reported p-values of all tests that the normality assumption 
cannot be rejected even at a=0,10 level of significance.  
5.2 Econometric results 
 
Table A2-2 in Appendix 2 reports the econometric results from the estimation of 
equations (4) & (6). Table 2 summarizes the main findings of econometric 
estimations. 
Table 2: Econometric Estimations from Regression Based Approach: 
Summary of results (%) 
 Nonoverlapping steps of an antitrust & abuse of dominant position case* 
Cumulative 
Average 
Residual ( 1τ ) ( 2τ ) ( 3τ ) ( 4τ ) ( 5τ ) 
0=τ  
-0,09 (>0,10) 3,98 (>0,10) -2,94 ( )01,0≤  -0,67 (>0,10) -2,16 ( )05,0≤  
5+=τ  0,53 (>0,10) 4,18 (>0,10) -2,85 ( )01,0≤  -1,56 (>0,10) -2,78 ( )05,0≤  
Source: Table A2-2, Appendix 2. 
*
1τ : Down raids , 2τ :Statement of Objections , 3τ : HCC Decision 4τ : Pre – final Court of Appeal Decision 
, 5τ : Final Court of Appeal Decision  
p-values in parenthesis 
 
On the one hand, during the ‘Investigation Period’ the only statistically significant 
cumulative average effect on infringed firm’s share price is 3τ , that is, the final 
decision of HCC. At 0=τ  the issuing of the decision causes a 2,94% cumulative 
average drop in the infringed firm’s share value, while the overall average effect  
( 5+=τ ) causes a 2,85% cumulative average drop in the infringed firm’s share value.  
On the other hand, during the ‘Deterrence Period’, the final decision of the Court of 
Appeal causes a statistically significant 2,16% in the share price of the infringed 
firms. The same picture holds at the date of the release of the public information 
( 0=τ ). The share price of the involved firms statistically decline 2,78%. Following 
Langus & Motta (2009), ‘This implies a very quick rely of the news to the investors’.  
The release of 1τ , 2τ  & 4τ  does not cause a statistically significant effect (either 
negative or positive) in the infringed firm’s share price during the *ot  - 10 −t period. 
Cumulative average residual on the day of the surprise inspection is negative but not 
statistically significant, suggesting a 0.01% drop in the firm’s share price the date 
0=τ  where the dawn raid is carried out. The overall cumulative average effect is 
positive (0,53%), but not statistically significant. 
Additionally, the temporal recall of the final decision of HCC ( 4τ ) causes an 
unstatistically significant negative effect in the share price of involved firms, either at 
date 0=τ  or at date 5+=τ .  
However, 4 days and 1 day prior to surprise inspection, the average residual is 
negative and statistical significant at the level of a=0,10 (see Table A2-2 in Appendix 
2). The same picture we get 2 and 3 days after the down raid. Its effect is negative and 
positive and statistical significant at the level of a=0,10 respectively.  
During the issuing of the final decision of HCC the average residual of involved firms 
is negative 5, 3 and 2 days prior the date 0=τ . That may indicate a negative decision 
of HCC was expected by the financial investors. 
Moreover, during the 0t - 1t  period of 2τ , the average residual of infringed firms is 
positive and statistical significant at the level of a=0,01 five and two dates prior the 
issuing of the Statement of Objections by the GDC of HCC. Also, the same holds for 
the average residual of involved firms during the 0t - 1t  period of 4τ . At date 4+=τ , 
the average residual causes a statistically significant at the level a=0,01 negative 
effect of -2,91% in the share price of infringed firms. 
Table A2-2 in Appendix 2 also reports diagnostic tests and equality tests of the 
variance of residuals. The results of diagnostic tests imply that the final method of 
estimation fix the volatility effect in the residuals. The latter can be verified by the p-
value of the equality tests of residual’s variance between the 0t - 1t  & 
*
ot  - 10 −t  
periods. In all cases we reject the null hypothesis of statistically significant difference 
between the aforementioned residual’s variance. 
6 Concluding remarks and further research 
  
In this paper I assume the following public information which may affect the share 
price of the infringed firms: a) the down raids, b) the issue of the Statement of 
Objection, c) the final Decision of the HCC and the Court Decisions. The first three 
constitutes the ‘Investigation period’ and the last two constitute the ‘Deterrence 
period’. I use aggregate regression based approach to evaluate the effect of the 
release of the abovementioned public information in the share price of the firms 
which infringe articles 1 & 2 of Greek Competition Law. Especially, I estimate a 
dummy variable model with autoregressive components of order p and a GARCH 
(1,1) model in case where volatility effect persists in the residuals for each release of 
public information. 
The econometric estimations suggest that during the ‘Investigation Period’ and the 
‘Deterrence Period’, the cumulative average residuals of the infringed firms drop by -
2,85% and -2,78% respectively. Therefore, I state that the release of the final 
decisions of the HCC and the Court of Appeal, negatively affect the share price of the 
infringed firms. Despite the fact that I do not get statistically significant cumulative 
average results during the release of 1τ , 2τ  & 4τ , there are average residuals prior and 
after the release of the public information which are statistically significant.  
In this paper I discuss mainly the aggregate regression based approach. However, firm 
level analysis may also be desirable so as to capture the effect of the public 
information on the infringed firm’s share price. For this scope, equation (4) in 
conjunction with Boehmer et al. (1991) t-test may be used for single firm analysis. 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) with robust standard errors and maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) with non-proportional heteroscedasticity may be useful 
supplements to OLS with robust standard errors20.  Also, quantitative event study may 
be a useful extension of this paper21.  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
Table A1-1: Normality Tests 
Returns: 1τ       
 Firm Market Index    
Jarque-Bera Test 
Lilliefors 
3,26 (0,20) 
0,04 (>0,10) 
3,15 (0,31) 
0,03 (>0,10)    
Cramer-von Mises 
Watson 
Anderson-Darling 
0,05 (0,53) 
0,05 (0,51) 
0,40 (0,36) 
0,04 (0,70) 
0,04 (0,65) 
0,26 (0,71)       
Returns: 2τ            
 Firm Market Index    
Jarque-Bera Test 3,52 (0,17) 3,86 (0,06)    
Lilliefors  
Cramer-von Mises 
Watson 
Anderson-Darling 
0,03 (>0,10) 
0,05 (0,54) 
0,05 (0,50) 
0,35 (0,48) 
0,05 (>0,10) 
0,10 (0,12) 
0,09 (0,13) 
0,71 (0,07)       
Returns: 3τ  
          
 Firm Market Index    
Jarque-Bera Test 0,76 (0,68) 0,19 (0,90)    
Lilliefors  
Cramer-von Mises 
Watson 
Anderson-Darling 
0,03 (>0,10) 
0,02 (0,92) 
0,02 (0,92) 
0,14 (0,98) 
0,03 (>0,10) 
0,02 (0,97) 
0,02 (0,97) 
0,16 (0,96)    
 Returns: 4τ  
          
 Firm Market Index    
Jarque-Bera Test 1,05 (0,59) 1,51 (0,47)    
Lilliefors  
Cramer-von Mises 
Watson 
Anderson-Darling 
0,03 (>0,10) 
0,04 (0,75) 
0,03 (0,75) 
0,25 (0,75) 
0,03 (>0,10) 
0,03 (0,83) 
0,03 (0,85) 
0,19 (0,90)    
 Returns: 5τ  
          
 Firm Market Index    
Jarque-Bera Test 1,60 (0,45) 4,62 (0,10)    
Lilliefors  
Cramer-von Mises 
Watson 
Anderson-Darling 
0,03 (>0,10) 
0,03 (0,82) 
0,03 (0,79) 
0,22 (0,82) 
0,04 (>0,10) 
0,07 (0,25) 
0,07 (0,27) 
0,46 (0,26)    
Source: Author's Elaboration of Data         
a=0,10 (p-value<0,10) a=0,05 (p-value<0,5) a=0,01 (p-value<0,01)     
p-value in parenthesis.            
1τ : Down raids , 2τ :Statement of Objections , 3τ : HCC Decision 4τ : Pre – final Court of Appeal Decision , 
5τ : Final Court of Appeal Decision  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1-2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Sample Statistics: 1τ *           
 Mean Std Skew. Kurt. Obs. 
0t - 1t  Period 
-0,01 0,6 1,5 4,44 11 
*
ot  - 10 −t Period 0,11 0,47 -0,12 3,43 300 
Total 0,11 0,47 -0,12 3,44 311 
Sample Statistics: 2τ *           
 Mean Std Skew. Kurt. Obs. 
0t - 1t  Period 
-0,2 0,84 -1,31 4,02 11 
*
ot  - 10 −t Period 0,02 0,8 0,06 3,45 300 
Total 0,02 0,8 0,01 3,52 311 
Sample Statistics: 3τ * 
          
 Mean Std Skew. Kurt. Obs. 
0t - 1t  Period 
-0,2 0,87 -0,5 2,63 11 
*
ot  - 10 −t Period 0,05 0,67 0,16 3,08 300 
Total 0,04 0,67 0,1 3,15 311 
Sample Statistics: 4τ * 
 Mean Std Skew. Kurt. Obs. 
0t - 1t  Period 
-0,36 0,6 -1,68 5,6 11 
*
ot  - 10 −t Period 
-0,01 0,64 -0,1 2,98 300 
Total -0,01 0,64 -0,13 3,12 311 
Sample Statistics:  5τ * 
 Mean Std Skew. Kurt. Obs. 
0t - 1t  Period 
-0,47 0,62 0,002 2 11` 
*
ot  - 10 −t Period 
-0,01 0,58 0,07 3,38 300 
Total -0,03 0,59 0,04 3,34 311 
Source: Author's Elaboration of Data 
*See Table A1-1 
  
Table A1-3: Equality Tests 
Equality tests of means and variances in 0t - 1t  , 
*
ot  - 10 −t Periods 
Returns: 1τ *      
 Means^ Variances^^    
t-Test 2,18 4,42    
p-Value 0,17 0,1       
Returns: 2τ * 
          
 Means^ Variances^^    
t-Test 0,83 80,19    
p-Value 0,58 0,00       
Returns: 3τ * 
          
 Means^ Variances^^    
t-Test 1,93 1,57    
p-Value 0,21 0,27    
 Returns: 4τ *           
 Means^ Variances^^    
t-Test 1,47 3,22    
p-Value 0,32 0,09    
 Returns: 5τ * 
          
 Means^^ Variances^^    
t-Test 2,92 3,45    
p-Value 0,21 0,08    
Source: Author's Elaboration of Data         
a=0,10 (p-value<0,10) a=0,05 (p-value<0,5) a=0,01 (p-value<0,01)     
^F-Anova test ^^Welch F-test           
*See Table A1-1      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2-1: Normality Tests (Residuals) Regression Based Approach 
Residuals: Down raids      
 AR(4) 
Jarque-Bera Test 0,74 (0,69) 
Residuals: Statement of Objections           
 GARCH(1,1) 
Jarque-Bera Test 1,84 (0,40) 
Residuals: HCC Decision           
 AR(8) 
Jarque-Bera Test 2,65 (0,27) 
 Residuals: Court Decision 1           
 OLS 
Jarque-Bera Test 1,06 (0,59) 
 Residuals: Court Decision 2           
 AR(2) 
Jarque-Bera Test 1,19 (0,55) 
Source: Author's Elaboration of Data         
a=0,10 (p-value<0,10) a=0,05 (p-value<0,5) a=0,01 (p-value<0,01)     
p-value in parenthesis.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2-2: Coefficient Estimates: Regression Based Approach 
- 1τ  - AR(4) 
Coefficients AR^ Std (AR) t-AR p-value CAR^^ Std(CAR) t-CAR p-value^^^ 
a 0,07 0,03 2,61 0,01     
Rm 0,72 0,08 9,50 0,00     
AR(4) 0,13 0,06 2,29 0,02     
D-5 -0,48 0,41 -1,17 0,24 -0,48 0,41 -1,17 
>0,10 
D-4 0,68 0,41 -1,66 0,09 0,20 0,58 0,34 
D-3 0,13 0,41 0,32 0,75 0,33 0,71 0,46 
D-2 -0,27 0,41 -0,65 0,51 0,06 0,82 0,07 
D-1 -0,70 0,41 -1,68 0,09 -0,64 0,92 -0,70 
D 0 0,55 0,42 1,30 0,19 -0,09 1,03 -0,09 
D+1 0,54 0,41 1,31 0,19 0,45 1,08 0,41 
D+2 -1,09 0,42 -2,62 0,01 -0,64 1,19 -0,54 
D+3 0,97 0,42 2,34 0,02 0,33 1,26 0,26 
D+4 0,36 0,41 0,88 0,38 0,69 1,30 0,53 
D+5 0,03 0,41 0,07 0,94 0,72 1,36 0,53 
Diagnostic Statistics (Ljung-Box Q-statistic) 
 Stat p-value       
Q (4) residual  2,99 0,4       
Q (4) residual2 0,86 0,84       
p-value for F test for equality of event and non event residual variances (Brown-Forsythe statistic) 
 p-value       
  
0,42             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2-2: (continued) 
- 3τ  - AR(8) 
Coefficients AR^ Std (AR) t-AR p-value CAR^^ Std(CAR) t-CAR p-value^^^ 
a 0,06 0,03 1,87 0,06     
Rm 0,37 0,07 5,05 0,00     
D-5 -2,17 0,63 -3,43 0,00 -2,17 0,63 -3,44 
01,0≤  
D-4 -0,12 0,64 -0,20 0,84 -2,29 0,91 -2,53 
D-3 -0,67 0,63 -3,43 0,00 -2,96 1,09 -2,71 
D-2 -1,11 0,63 -1,76 0,08 -4,07 1,26 -3,23 
D-1 -0,07 0,63 -0,10 0,92 -4,14 1,41 -2,94 
D 0 -0,39 0,63 -0,61 0,54 -4,53 1,54 -2,94 
D+1 -0,51 0,63 -0,80 0,42 -5,04 1,67 -3,02 
D+2 -0,42 0,63 0,67 0,50 -5,46 1,78 -3,06 
D+3 -0,74 0,64 -1,16 0,25 -6,20 1,92 -3,23 
D+4 0,69 0,64 1,08 0,28 -5,51 2,02 -2,72 
D+5 -0,53 0,64 -0,83 0,41 -6,04 2,12 -2,85 
AR(8) -0,15 0,06 -2,59 0,01     
Diagnostic Statistics (Ljung-Box Q-statistic) 
 Stat p-value       
Q (4) residual  8,68 0,28       
Q (4) residual2 5,40 0,61       
p-value of F test for equality of event and non event residual variances (Brown-Forsythe statistic) 
 p-value         
 
0,41        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2-2: (continued) 
- 2τ  - GARCH(1,1) 
Coefficients AR^ Std (AR) t-AR p-value CAR^^ Std(CAR) t-CAR p-value^^^ 
a 0,04 0,07 0,86 0,39     
Rm 0,59 0,07 8,34 0,00     
D-5 1,68 0,40 4,43 0,00 1,68 0,40 4,20 0,00 
D-4 -0,55 3,79 -0,15 0,88 1,13 5,36 0,21 >0,10 
D-3 0,10 0,42 0,25 0,80 1,23 0,73 1,69 0,09 
D-2 2,62 0,41 6,35 0,00 3,85 0,82 4,70 0,00 
D-1 -0,35 5,68 -0,06 0,95 3,50 12,70 0,28 >0,10 
D 0 0,48 3,29 0,15 0,88 3,98 8,06 0,49 >0,10 
D+1 0,79 0,59 1,34 0,18 4,77 1,56 3,06 0,00 
D+2 0,95 5,14 0,18 0,85 5,72 14,54 0,39 >0,10 
D+3 -0,34 1,27 -0,27 0,79 5,38 3,81 1,41 >0,10 
D+4 -0,03 72,14 0,00 0,99 5,35 228,13 0,02 >0,10 
D+5 -1,17 1,60 -0,70 0,47 4,18 5,31 0,79 >0,10 
AR(4) 0,15 0,05 2,83 0,00     
Variance Equation  
 Coef Std (AR) t-value p-value     
Constant  0,20 0,14 1,45 0,15     
ARCH 0,13 0,07 1,74 0,08     
GARCH 1,45 0,32 1,42 0,15     
Diagnostic Statistics (Ljung-Box Q-statistic) 
 Stat p-value       
Q (4) residual  2,00 0,57       
Q (4) residual2 3,00 0,40       
p-value of F test for equality of event and non event residual variances (Brown-Forsythe statistic) 
 p-value       
  
0,83             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 4τ  - OLS (Table A2-2 continued) 
a 0,02 0,04 0,48 0,63     
Rm 0,42 0,09 4,89 0,00     
D-5 -0,41 0,62 -0,66 0,51 -0,41 0,62 -0,66 
>0,10 
D-4 0,37 0,62 0,60 0,55 -0,04 0,88 -0,05 
D-3 -0,49 -0,62 -0,80 0,42 -0,53 -1,07 0,49 
D-2 0,29 0,62 0,47 0,64 -0,24 1,24 -0,19 
D-1 -0,38 0,62 -0,62 0,53 -0,62 1,39 -0,45 
D 0 -0,40 0,62 -0,65 0,51 -1,02 1,52 -0,67 
D+1 0,00 0,62 0,00 0,99 -1,02 1,64 -0,62 
D+2 0,03 0,62 -0,05 0,96 -0,99 1,75 -0,56 
D+3 -0,19 0,62 -0,31 0,75 -1,18 1,86 -0,63 
D+4 -1,79 0,62 -2,91 0,00 -2,97 1,96 -1,51 
D+5 -0,19 0,61 -0,32 0,75 -3,16 2,02 -1,56 
Diagnostic Statistics (Ljung-Box Q-statistic) 
 
 Stat p-value      
Q (until 12 lags) residual  >0,10      
Q (until 36 lags) residual2 >0,30      
F test for equality of event and non event residual variances (Brown-Forsythe statistic) 
 p-value       
 
0,71       
- 5τ  - AR(2) 
a 0,02 0,04 0,64 0,52     
Rm 0,41 0,06 7,17 0,00     
AR(2) 0,18 0,06 3,09 0,00     
D-5 0,11 0,54 0,20 0,84 0,11 0,54 0,20 
>=0,10 D-4 -1,08 0,54 -2,00 0,05 -0,97 0,76 -1,27 
D-3 -0,37 0,55 -0,67 0,50 -1,34 0,95 -1,41 
D-2 -0,86 0,55 -1,57 0,11 -2,20 1,10 -2,00 ≤ 0,05 
D-1 0,55 0,55 1,00 0,32 -1,65 1,23 -1,34 >=0,10 
D 0 -1,26 0,55 -2,30 0,02 -2,91 1,35 -2,16 
≤ 0,05 
D+1 0,12 0,55 0,23 0,82 -2,79 1,46 -1,92 
D+2 -0,32 0,55 -0,56 0,57 -3,11 1,56 -2,00 
D+3 -0,31 0,55 -0,56 0,58 -3,42 1,65 -2,07 
D+4 -1,45 0,55 -2,65 0,01 -4,87 1,74 -2,80 
D+5 -0,20 0,55 -0,36 0,72 -5,07 1,82 -2,78 
Diagnostic Statistics (Ljung-Box Q-statistic) 
 Stat p-value       
Q (2) residual  1,04 0,31       
Q (2) residual2 0,72 0,40       
p-value of F test for equality of event and non event residual variances (Brown-Forsythe statistic) 
 p-value       
  
0,10             
Source: Author's Elaboration of Data, a=0,10 (p-value<0,10) a=0,05 (p-value<0,5) a=0,01 (p-value<0,01) 
^Average Residual ^^Cumulative Average Residual ^^^ (two - tailed) - Degrees of Freedom: 298 
 
